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VOICE FILE NAME: The Hon. Michael Kirby  
 
SO: Sue Onslow (Interviewer) 
MK: Michael Kirby (Respondent) 
 
SO: This is Sue Onslow talking to the Honourable Michael Kirby in Sydney 
on Friday, 28th March, 2014. Mr Kirby, thank you very much indeed for 
agreeing to take part in this oral history project. I wonder if you could 
begin by reflecting, Sir, on the establishment of the Eminent Persons’ 
Group of 2009-2010? Obviously, this came out of the Port of Spain 
affirmation in 2009, but I wondered if you could lay some background of 
how you came to be appointed to that group? 
 
MK: I’m not sure how the appointment came about. Sometimes it’s better not to 
know how appointments to national or international bodies occur. However, I 
was approached, first, I think, by a representative of the Australian 
government to ask if I would serve; then I received a letter from the Secretary-
General, Mr Sharma, and he invited me to serve. I then accepted, and I 
served. But I’m not aware of the steps that were taken to secure my 
appointment. They may have arisen out of the fact that I had taken quite an 
active part over the years in the work of the Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
Division of the Commonwealth. I had contributed repeatedly to the 
Commonwealth Law Bulletin. I had gone repeatedly to Commonwealth Law 
conferences, and presented papers at them. I had not been a member of the 
political activities of the Commonwealth, but of basically the legal and support 
systems of the Commonwealth, which is often where it does its best work. 
 
The first time I ever visited Marlborough House was back in the 1970s, when I 
was appointed the first chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commission. 
The head of the English Law Commission convened a meeting of the 
Commonwealth law reform agencies. We gathered in that big dining room in 
Marlborough House, wandered around the grounds, where Queen Mary had 
wandered, and that was my first encounter with the Commonwealth 
Secretariat. After that, I had intermittent contacts with Secretaries General. 
But the Eminent Persons’ Group was really the first appointment to take part 
in a political-type activity of the Commonwealth Secretariat. 
 
SO: So you also helped – I realise that this was under an UNDP initiative - as 
an independent co-chair at the Malawi constitutional conference in 1994. 
 
MK: Yes, but I think that was really done not under the Commonwealth umbrella. 
That was done for Malawi. Indeed, it was done on the initiative of the then 
University  of  London 
INSTITUTE OF COMMONWEALTH STUDIES 
2 
 
United States Ambassador to Malawi. He it was that suggested me, after I 
had been to a conference in Malawi. That was a conference on legal issues, I 
think. But he apparently thought that I might be able to fulfil the duties as an 
independent co-chair of the constitutional body that was considering 
amendments at the Malawi Constitution, to get rid of the one-party state, and 
the life tenure of President Hastings Banda. But that was not a 
Commonwealth initiative. I think that was an initiative of UNDP, spurred on by 
the US Ambassador to Malawi, because I remember myself being, at the 
time, a little surprised that it was the United States which was taking a lead 
role, rather than the Commonwealth, or Britain. 
 
SO: Yes. I had just wondered, looking at this, given your wealth of 
experience, had you been approached to help with the South African 
constitution building before 1994? Or had you, in the 2000s, been asked 
to contribute to Kenya’s revision of its constitution, in a Commonwealth 
dimension? 
 
MK: Well, the South African initiative happened because of the fact that South 
Africa was out of the Commonwealth. I was again invited more in a legal 
capacity to go to meetings in South Africa which were addressed to the role of 
international law in the development of constitutional and other law. I was 
never really a member of the successive two committees that drafted the 
successive constitutions of South Africa. I simply took part in seminars that 
happened in South Africa. Those seminars were in a series called the 
Bangalore series of meetings about the role of international law in domestic 
law-making. I think a series of about seven conferences were held under the 
joint auspices of Interights, an organisation of human rights law based in 
London, and the Commonwealth Secretariat’s Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
division. Lord Anthony Lester was the moving spirit of those seminars. Former 
Chief Justice Bhagwati of India was also one of the leaders of the seminars. I 
became involved in them. That was how I got into the South African 
constitutional change. I don’t believe I took any active part in the Kenya 
constitutional amendments. 
 
SO: I was just thinking laterally about your possible involvement in other 
Commonwealth legal environments as well as your assistance to 
Commonwealth constitutional change. So thank you very much indeed 
for clarifying that. 
 
 Going back to the establishment of the Eminent Persons’ Group: how 
much did you take your terms of reference directly from the Port of 
Spain affirmation? Or were you also using the Royal Commonwealth 
Society’s ‘Commonwealth Conversation’, its dialogue, where it had 
sought to establish a conversation in wider terms, of what was identified 
as wrong with the Commonwealth, to support your work in assessing its 
problems and the identification of solutions? 
 
MK: I think all of the above. We had our letter of appointment. That drew attention 
to the Port of Spain resolution of heads of government. That was our 
mandate. But the resolution was in rather general terms. Therefore, there was 
plenty of leeway for us to shape the direction of our own enquiry, investigation 
and conclusions. As you would know, Ronald (Sir Ronald Sanders) took the 
lead as the Rapporteur, by concurrence of the members. He did so at the 
request of the chairman; and he played a most beneficial and leading role in 
the EPG. I have to pay a tribute to his ability, integrity, devotion, love of the 
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Commonwealth, and knowledge of the internal mechanics of the 
Commonwealth. He was much more aware of those than I was. He was 
aware of the whole range of activities, whereas my focus had been basically 
on the legal activities. Moreover, he was the son-in-law of Sonny Ramphal 
(Sir Shridath Ramphal), and he had had himself a lot of engagement with 
Commonwealth activities. Therefore, he was much more aware of the broad 
spectrum. I was rather narrowly focused. 
 
SO: There were four meetings of the committee: there were two in London, 
then the one in Kuala Lumpur, and then the one in March of 2011, back 
in London. How elaborate were these meetings? Were they convening to 
compare notes? Were you drawing upon preparation of reports by 
others who had been designated to carry out their investigations? 
 
MK: My recollection is that the only meeting that was really elaborate was the 
meeting in Kuala Lumpur. We there were wined and dined, and treated most 
royally by the Malaysia government. They are very hospitable people. We 
were taken to the Prime Minister’s residence, at what seemed to be a 
hundred miles an hour in a series of cars, rushing through the crowded 
streets of Kuala Lumpur, and causing havoc to everybody else in a way that 
just could not happen in Sydney, or I think even London. We did have some 
papers, but a lot of the legwork was done by Sir Ronald. He really prepared 
documents, and we worked on those. We debated a series of sub-topics. 
Anybody could raise anything within the frame of reference of the Port of 
Spain resolution. It set out what [the heads of government] thought was 
important for the Commonwealth. For example, I thought that the fact of 
Commonwealth citizenship and nationality status, as a Commonwealth 
citizen, was being ignored, and given no weight whatsoever in the practical 
matter of crossing borders into Commonwealth countries. In particular, in the 
United Kingdom, there is a line for EU, European, passports, and others. I 
was very concerned to try to get a recommendation for investigation of the 
possibility of having a second line for Commonwealth citizens. This would 
give them some degree of priority. It was always offensive, I think, to 
Australian Commonwealth citizens to turn up in London, just to be dumped 
into the general line with all sorts of people, including those rebels from the 
United States of America. But some of my colleagues on the EPG thought 
that that was completely wishful thinking, and very unlikely to get anywhere. 
However, I had a supporter in one of the assistant foreign ministers in the 
United Kingdom, in the House of Lords, (Lord Howell). He rather favoured my 
idea, and thought it was quite feasible. 
 
SO: Was this David Howell? 
 
MK: Yes, and he, in fact, met us. He would come along, and I think that caused 
some astonishment on the part of my colleagues, that a minister, and indeed 
a UK minister, thought that the idea I was supporting might have legs. 
Anyway, in the end, a proposal was included in our recommendations for 
investigation by officials of whether something could be done along those 
lines. I don’t know what, if anything, has happened about it. But Lord Howell 
was in favour of it. 
 
SO: It’s certainly worth following up, as you say, because it would give a 
firm sense of identity? 
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MK: Well, there’s no identity at all. The only time that citizenship of the 
Commonwealth matters is when you cross a border. But that is in practical 
terms. It can matter in sentiment, and it can matter in emotional, nostalgia, 
warm feelings. But the only time nationality is ever potentially valuable or 
damaging is when you come to a border. 
 
SO: You also mentioned in your article that appeared in the Commonwealth 
Law Bulletin, that there were aspects of new members which you found 
puzzling: the inclusion of non-former British Colonies, such as 
Mozambique, such as Rwanda, and that part of your agenda was to look 
at the criteria for membership, so that there should be a greater degree 
of transparency? 
 
MK: Yes. I rather gathered from things that were written in the public media that 
Mozambique was invited because of the relationship of President Mandela 
with Mrs Machel, who later became his wife. She was from Mozambique; and 
that seemed to me to be a rather unstable foundation for membership of the 
Commonwealth by a country which had had no real association, and didn’t 
have widespread use of the English language in official and other cases. As 
well as that, to the extent that you got away from the historical link, you 
potentially damaged the integrity of the Commonwealth by admitting other 
members, and thereby transferred the Commonwealth even more than in the 
existing situation, to a pale reflection of the United Nations, with its strong 
geopolitical divisions. The African states tend, in the United Nations, to act 
with a very strong caucus arrangement; they are even more introspective than 
the Europeans are now. Abandoning the idea of the Commonwealth as a 
cross-cutting organisation, which links people on every continent simply 
because of their historical links to the British Crown during the times of 
Empire, I thought would be a dangerous move. My colleagues were not quite 
so favourable to that idea either. But they watered down the version of the 
hesitations that I had expressed. But there is still a mention of it, I think, in the 
document, in the report to the EPG. However, it wasn’t quite as strongly 
signalling orange lights against further expansion of the Commonwealth. 
However, maybe a whisper was as good as a clear orange light, because no 
other non-English-speaking historically-linked country has been introduced 
into the Commonwealth in recent years. 
 
SO: Sir, could I ask you about the evolution of the idea of a Commonwealth 
Human Rights Commissioner? 
 
MK: That was seen by all of us, I believe, to be inherent in the proposal to have a 
charter. Just to have a document called a charter, would seem to have been 
worthless, or at least unnecessary, when you had already statements in a 
succession of the closing resolutions of the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government at CHOGM meetings. There had been many such statements: 
the Singapore Declaration and so on. The charter would only be turned into 
something of practical use if you had an office-holder whose responsibility it 
was to be specially protective of charter values, and stimulating the education 
and other steps that would be required to make sure that the charter became 
an actuality. And that it was not just as unknown document amongst 
Commonwealth citizens, as the CHOGM resolutions are. Those resolutions, 
no doubt, resonate in the minds of the people who occupy positions in 
Marlborough House. But the citizens of the Commonwealth are blissfully 
ignorant of these resolutions. 
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SO: I think the Sri Lanka communiqué announcement runs to some 11,000 
words. 
 
MK: Oh, my God! I didn’t know that. I’ve never had the misfortune of reading it. 
 
SO: But what you’re identifying, then, is a particular attachment [of the 
Commonwealth] to process, and grand declarations, rather than, in fact, 
practical value in implementation. 
 
MK: Yes. Also, I had had some dealings with the human rights mechanisms, as 
they were emerging in the United Nations’ system. I had known personally 
each of the successive six High Commissioners for Human Rights (I think it’s 
six) – José Ayala-Lasso, Mary Robinson, Sergio di Mello, the Brazilian who 
was killed in the line of duty; Louise Arbour, Navi Pillay and now Prince Zeid 
Al-Hussein. They were able, in their different ways, to stimulate, encourage, 
provoke, criticise, but get attention to the UN instruments. And to raise the 
profile and extract a cost for ignoring the agreed values. 
 
SO: So was there debate within the EPG, that a proposal for a Human Rights 
Commissioner for the Commonwealth risked duplicating the work of a 
UN Human Rights Commissioner? 
 
MK: Well, there was debate about whether a Commissioner would just be 
duplication. But as we were minded to propose a Charter, an idea which 
arose in the very first meeting, and was suggested by Tun Abdullah Badawi, 
the Chairman of the EPG, we didn’t think that that would be effective if there 
was no mechanism, or office-holder, to translate it from the language of a 
document into real activity. Also, we believed that we had the support of the 
Secretary-General on that matter, because never once during the 
deliberations did Secretary-General Sharma indicate his disagreement with it. 
We were guests invited into the chamber of the CHOGM meeting in Perth.  
When he there declared that he was not in favour of it, it came both as a 
surprise and a blow to the EPG. This was because we thought that, if he had 
been opposed to it, he would have told us. But he didn’t. 
 
SO: So, following your meetings - and you said that you had four before the 
report was presented to the Secretary-General earlier in the summer of 
2011... 
 
MK: It wasn’t quite like that. The Secretary-General sat at the table, and was there 
present during all of the debates. He was not a stranger who was up there in 
his room, waiting humbly for our recommendations. He participated. 
 
SO: Thank you for saying that he was actually physically present at the 
meeting, when these discussions were taking place. 
 
MK: Oh yes, present and active, and very useful. Of course, he’s very 
knowledgeable about the internal operations and programmes and so on. He 
took a constructive and active and opinionative role. This made all the more 
surprising the fact that what all of us regarded as a key proposal was 
torpedoed at a critical moment during the Perth CHOGM, when the Secretary-
General said he didn’t agree with it, and didn’t think it was necessary. 
 
SO: And you’d had absolutely no inkling of his opposition beforehand? 
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MK: No, no inkling. None. 
 
SO: How about the discussion over CMAG, the Commonwealth Ministerial 
Action Group? I know that was part of your remit to consider the extent 
to which it could be augmented in its ability to correct ‘serious and 
persistent violations’. 
 
MK: Yes, well, again the Secretary-General took an active part. I do have 
recollections that he had expressed some hesitations about the formula that 
we came up with. But not to the point that he turned really a full circle, and 
came down totally opposed to the proposal, as he did in the case of the 
Commissioner on Electoral Democracy, the Rule of Law and Human Rights. It 
wasn’t just a Human Rights Commissioner, it was a Commissioner to have 
responsibility for implementing the Charter. I am, at the moment, the mandate 
holder and chair of the Commission of Inquiry of the United Nations on North 
Korea. I therefore know, and work close up, with the agencies of the United 
Nations concerned with human rights. I see how important it is to have a 
Commissioner who will be brave and challenge the political organs of the 
Association. It is sometimes difficult for the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations to do some things. However, if you have a guardian watchdog who’s 
biting at your heels every now and again, and causing an issue to come onto 
the agenda, and stirring the debates, and speaking from a point of view of 
principle, rather than pure pragmatism, it is more likely that the institution will 
work. Indeed, it is respecting the fact that the political head is going 
sometimes to be in an awkward situation, when criticisms on human rights, 
rule of law, or electoral democracy bases, are raised. The ultimate job of the 
Secretary-General is to keep the Association together, and functioning. The 
job of the Commissioner is to stand up for principles. That is sometimes 
awkward and difficult for the SG to do, as indeed it is in the United Nations. 
 
SO: How did you account yourself then for Secretary-General Sharma’s 
opposition in the Perth CHOGM executive session? Do you think he was 
swayed by pragmatic considerations of costs? Swayed by (again) 
possible sensitivities to his own position, and the ambit of his office, 
that he’d perhaps been “got at” by another Commonwealth head who 
felt that this was inappropriate? 
 
MK: I don’t know. You will have to speak to him, if you haven’t already done so. 
 
SO: I’m waiting to interview him towards the end of his office. 
 
MK: Yes. First, he was running for re-election, I think. Certainly he wanted another 
term. Second, there would be a number of participants in Perth, and at all 
CHOGM meetings, who are natural born autocrats. They would not like to 
have the stimulation of a Commissioner. Third, he is a naturally very 
courteous and circumspect official, with a background in diplomacy. My own 
view is twofold, that the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the United 
Nations should only ever have one term. This is because, if he or she has the 
possibility of a second term, or more terms, there is a natural tendency to try 
to ensure that you get re-elected. Whereas if you only had one term, that 
would not be a problem. Better to have a longer one term than to have the 
spectacle of a High Commissioner having to try and trim the sails in order to 
get re-elected. Second, in terms of the Commonwealth Secretary-General, I 
would never myself recommend the election of an official. I think the 
Secretary-General of the Commonwealth should always be a former 
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politician. Politicians are much more likely to be brave and strong than 
officials. Officials are likely to be process-obsessed, and not obsessed with 
the principles and the ultimate purposes of the organisation. I think that could 
be demonstrated by contrasting the success of the successive Secretaries-
General of the Commonwealth. The most successful, in my view, have been 
former politicians, rather than officials. 
 
SO: Yes, so that would be Sonny Ramphal and Don McKinnon, as 
quintessential politicians rather than international servants. 
 
MK: Even Don McKinnon became, in the end, rather cautious, I thought. I wrote to 
him, urging him to take up the issue of the oppressive laws against 
homosexuals in Commonwealth countries, saying that, in his second term, he 
didn’t have to court favours. So he could be brave and strong, standing for a 
matter of principle. However, he didn’t do so. So it may be that my view is an 
over-simplistic view of the best qualities. But the danger is that officials, or 
people too long in office, will be too obsequious, and anxious to get on well 
with everybody, instead of anxious to make sure that the organisation is not 
seen as a bunch of hypocrites who are propounding great, resounding 
principles, but breaching them. And not doing anything, particularly not doing 
anything institutionally, to make sure that those principles are fulfilled, even 
when (as will eventually be the case) it is uncomfortable to do so. 
 
SO: The Port of Spain affirmation also called for improving the Secretariat’s 
performance, and I wondered the extent to which you recall a debate 
about the “good offices” section, the “good offices” role of the 
Secretary-General, in the EPG report. Was this the topic of much 
discussion? 
 
MK: Yes, there was. There was discussion of the “good offices” role. But we were 
concerned about the standard of the Secretariat, and the extent to which it 
was up to scratch, when compared with other international bodies with which 
we severally had associations. I had had associations, over the years, with a 
large number of the agencies of the United Nations, and also with the OECD. 
Patricia Francis had had associations with, and was a chief executive of an 
agency. Everybody had some connection with some other body. We were 
inclined to think that the Commonwealth Secretariat was an ultra-cautious 
group of officials who were obsequious, and inclined to non-transparency in a 
way that was more reflective of the techniques of administration that existed 
during the British Empire, and out of harmony with the techniques of 
administration which the more modern members of the Commonwealth had 
introduced in their own administration, often reluctantly, and often against the 
strongest possible opposition of the public service. 
 
SO: I wonder, sir, the extent to which that you’d identified this as being 
possibly reflective of Indian bureaucratic culture, rather than just the 
British Empire, and the bureaucratic culture? Obviously, there’s cross-
fertilisation between 19th and early 20th century British bureaucratic 
cultures and India’s own civil service. The British civil service itself had 
contributed to the formation of the Secretariat right from the start in 
1965. 
 
MK: I wouldn’t stereotype it as just Indian. In my experience, travelling to a number 
of Commonwealth countries, they are a type of time capsule. They are a time 
capsule of a period of administration which was marked by the Official 
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Secrets Act, by no Freedom of Information Act, no ombudsman, very little 
judicial review – judicial review confined essentially to lawfulness and insanity. 
The decisions of officials being challenged for judicial review had to be shown 
to be Wednesbury unreasonable. This was waived after the case involving the 
Wednesbury picture theatre in England. You had to show that no rational 
official could ever rationally come to the decision in question, in order to 
disturb it. That is such a high bar to get over, that very little relief was given by 
the courts. All of these things have changed in Britain and Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand, and South Africa now. 
 
SO: But you have this time capsule? 
 
MK: The time capsule goes on in the other countries of the Commonwealth. It’s 
not only in that respect, but in many other respects. It was reflected in the 
officialdom that we saw in Marlborough House. This is not to reflect on their 
honesty, but simply on their extreme caution. Their fear of controversy. Their 
objection to a more vibrant and active engagement with issues, people and 
civil society that could bind the Commonwealth more strongly together. One 
of the officers who was most impressive in the dialogues with the EPG was 
Steve Cutts. He was younger, more energetic, more direct, plain-speaking, 
more willing to look at innovations. He had had a background in the OECD. In 
my experience, chairing two expert groups of the OECD, that was even more 
dynamic than the United Nations. It was the association of the rich countries 
of the world. Therefore, one perhaps would expect it would be dynamic. But 
Steve Cutts came along, and talked very frankly about the salary levels of the 
officers of the Commonwealth Secretariat and other practical defects. Often 
because many of the Commonwealth Secretariat come from Commonwealth 
countries where salary levels are much lower, they are not paid at, nor really 
worth, the salary of a top official in an intergovernmental agency. You’re not 
going to get, and keep, top officials if you don’t pay them appropriately. 
Particularly in an expensive city like London. Steve Cutts left the 
Commonwealth Secretariat after the EPG. He’s now working for the United 
Nations in New York, I think. I was not surprised that he moved on. 
 
SO: Yes, he is. I saw him in Cambridge in January. 
 
MK: Well, he would be a very good acquisition to whoever got him, because he’s 
just a very clever, modern and innovative official. 
 
SO: And effective. 
 
MK: And effective, yes, and willing to speak up, and be very clear. That’s the sort 
of person that we needed as a Commissioner. A Commonwealth citizen who 
would call a spade a spade. However, instead, it’s a timid, frightened, 
cautious bureaucracy. There’s nothing really to put a burr under the saddle to 
stimulate the whole system. That is why whatever caused the Secretary-
General to either change his mind, or keep his mind secret until the last 
minute, so that it did maximum damage to withdraw support from it amongst 
the Heads of Government, whatever caused him to do that, it was antithetical 
to the best interests of the Commonwealth. It was damaging to the 
Commonwealth Secretariat. When my role in North Korea is finished, I 
propose to write to the Secretary-General, telling him just that. What he did 
was to strike a body blow at the guts of the central idea of the reform which 
the EPG put forward. And he did it in a way that respectfully, I thought, was 
dishonourable. More importantly, it deprived the reforms suggested of real 
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teeth. It left the Charter hanging on the line as something limp and rather 
worthless. It’s just more words, and it’s not really an effective institution. If 
there’s one thing the British taught the world, it was that to get progress, you 
usually have to have an institution. You’ve got to institutionalise it. That is 
usually done by an office-holder, or a group of office- holders. You thereby 
have a chance, if you appoint good people, to get the creaking bureaucracy, 
which is all-pervasive everywhere in this world, to operate in an effective way. 
In the age of Twitter and social networks, and jumbo jets, and the human 
genome, the Commonwealth is not going to survive unless it can be more 
‘with it’. It needs stimulus. It needs a burr under the saddle. That was what the 
EPG unanimously had in mind in suggesting the Commissioner. The Charter 
without the Commissioner was really an empty vessel. Subsequent events 
had demonstrated that fact. 
 
SO: Sir, you mentioned in your Commonwealth Law Bulletin article that you 
felt that the Commonwealth Foundation, with its agenda of 
strengthening civil society, and its broader remit and activities of 
collaborating and co-ordinating with NGOs, civil society, professional 
bodies, is a dynamic and valuable institution. What did you feel the 
Secretariat should concentrate on? If the Charter should have a Human 
Rights Commissioner, to act as that burr under the saddle, as you said, 
a willingness to take a strong political stance, and identifying and 
calling to account according to the principles of the Charter, what did 
you feel the Secretary-General and the Secretariat should concentrate 
on? 
 
MK: The Secretary-General would inevitably sometimes get to a position that he or 
she disagreed with the Commissioner. In the end, the political organs would 
have the last say. The Secretary-General would have the last say. That’s fine. 
In the North Korea exercise, we may well be facing that outcome in due 
course via veto by China, in the UN Security Council, of any action to deal 
with the grave crimes against humanity that have been disclosed. That’s how 
the system works. That’s all right – everyone understands that is how the 
institutions operate. But at least in the United Nations system, you do have a 
High Commissioner for Human Rights. You do have independent 
commissions of enquiry. They’re made up of strong people. These are people 
who are principled and brave. Principle and courage seem to be the qualities 
that are missing in the Commonwealth. Maybe they are even unwelcome. For 
an easy life, with high emphasis on ceremony and words. If that is the 
essence perhaps you don’t need this stimulation. But if the organisation is 
going to survive and flourish, well I’m sorry, but you do need to have a lot 
more energy than is presently visible. You need occasionally to annoy and 
irritate those who defy or ignore the principles of the Charter. 
 
SO: In the run up to the Perth CHOGM, I know that you and your colleagues 
on the EPG had already presented the report. I understand that you had 
drafted the charter yourself? – am I right in this? 
 
MK: Well, I played a part, a big part, in doing that. But it was approved by all of us. 
Amendments and suggestions were made by all of us. Then, subsequently, 
there were further amendments proposed by officials, before the final form of 
the Charter, after Perth, was adopted. 
 
SO: But, in the run up to Perth, I know that you had presented your 
considered and amalgamated report to the Secretary-General, with a 
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view to it being published before the heads of government meeting. I 
know from talking to Sir Malcolm Rifkind that you were immensely 
irritated at the delay in publication. 
 
MK: Yes. In fact, we were told that the report of the EPG was not to be disclosed 
publicly. Sir Malcolm, as only a former British Foreign Secretary might do, 
threw his copy of the report down on the table at our final press conference. 
He declared that he was revealing it here and now. He made it available. I 
think the rest of us were a bit inclined to go along with the rules. But he’d had 
enough. He took the view that the report should be disclosed. So he disclosed 
his copy. After that, of course, the wall of the dam broke. The report became 
public. But it didn’t save the proposed office of the Commissioner. This was 
because the role of the Commissioner had been torpedoed by the Secretary-
General. 
 
SO: Mr Kirby, to what extent was the presentation and consideration of the 
EPG report also tangled up in Australian politics around the Perth 
CHOGM meeting? 
 
MK: I don’t remember that that was a factor. I do remember that the Perth 
CHOGM was memorable because of the big Australia barbecue attended by 
the Queen, just before she left Australia on what may have been her last visit. 
The very enthusiastic reception by the citizens in Perth of the Queen was 
overwhelming, and heart-warming, I thought, myself. But I don’t know that 
Australian politics intruded. 
 
SO: I’m just wondering of the tension between Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard, 
if that played out at all? 
 
MK: I don’t think that that was noticeable. Mr Rudd was the Foreign Minister, and 
he chaired a session of CHOGM which was dealing with issues of the Charter 
and so on. He basically had quite a lot of success getting it through. He was a 
good Foreign Minister. He was in his element, and respected as Foreign 
Minister. And he was a former Prime Minister present at CHOGM in Perth. I 
don’t think that the Gillard/Rudd issue, although very disruptive elsewhere in 
Australian public life, was a big factor. I don’t have a recollection that it was a 
big issue in Perth. 
 
SO: Speaking of a big issue in Perth though, to what extent do you recall, or 
did you have inside knowledge, of tensions around the choice of 
Colombo as the next Commonwealth heads of government meeting? 
 
MK: I don’t really think that was up for debate. This was because it had originally 
been decided that the 2009 CHOGM would be held in Colombo. Then, 
because of the state of the conflict in Sri Lanka, it was switched to Perth. 
However, this was agreed on the footing that the next CHOGM would be held 
in Colombo. It was only a postponement, not a vacation of the venue. 
 
SO: I just wondered if you recalled any private discussion saying that this is 
not going to be appropriate, if we’re emphasising that this should be the 
venue to accept a report for a charter which emphasises the importance 
of universal human rights? 
 
MK: Don’t forget that I wasn’t there as a politician, to take part in the politics of 
CHOGM – I was there basically as an “expert”, or official. Also I, from my own 
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work for a decade as the chair of the Australian Law Reform Commission, 
knew that my role was important, but subordinate. All we had to do was to 
make our proposals, report them, and then the decision-making on them was 
a matter for the Heads of Government. So I didn’t really get involved in the 
issues relating to the suitability of Sri Lanka. This was because I would have 
regarded that as at a level of politics that really wasn’t the role of the EPG to 
offer. The Heads of Government would know the difficulties that Sri Lanka 
would present as a place for debating, and following up, issues of human 
rights. 
 
SO: I wondered how far you, as an Eminent Persons’ Group, remain in touch 
with a view to seeing how far the Secretariat has addressed issues that 
you raised in your report, and whether there is any consistent pressure 
for the Secretariat to both respond or to implement your 
recommendations? 
 
MK: We demitted office at the CHOGM meeting. We were functus officio. We had 
delivered our report, and therefore we had no future corporate existence. That 
was the legal position, and we all understood that. We’ve therefore not 
pretended to a corporate existence that we don’t have. However, members of 
the EPG have kept in touch by email contact over the years since Perth, 
largely I should say, this has happened because Sir Ronald has given a 
series of very powerful lectures, and he has shared them with us. I’ve been 
deflected into other activities concerned with the United Nations. I haven’t 
been as active as both Sir Ronald Sanders and Senator Hugh Segal in 
Commonwealth concerns. They have been the two most engaged members, 
Senator Segal was appointed by Prime Minister Harper of Canada to be a 
Commonwealth emissary on Commonwealth matters. He has made some 
excellent addresses, which he sends to us. He sometimes discusses and 
debates them with us as he thinks appropriate. 
 
SO: So what would you say, as an expert and a long-term, highly-qualified 
professional involved in Commonwealth law matters, for the 
Commonwealth going forward, is part of its strength? Or do you see it, 
in fact, progressively dwindling into being an increasingly irrelevant 
international organisation? 
 
MK: I see it dwindling, and become increasingly irrelevant. Indeed, a question may 
arise as to whether it survives the demise of the Crown, because the Queen 
has been a kind of cement that has kept the Commonwealth having a 
distinctive continuity and identity. Heads of Government of the 
Commonwealth like to be in the presence of the Queen. I think her presence 
has been one of the attractions of going, and getting Heads of Government, 
as distinct from second heads or third heads. Sir Ronald Sanders has 
published an excellent paper on the upcoming meeting in Malta, in which he 
has insisted on the importance of the retreat. He says that only Heads of 
Government should be allowed to go there. He argues that, if you dilute that 
event with officials and lower functionaries, then it’s not going to really work.  
It was the very fact that it was Heads of Government that were meeting 
together that led to the informality, self-confidence and give-and-take and 
friendliness which had been a feature of Commonwealth meetings up till the 
last decade. 
 
SO: So you’re identifying not simply the Monarch as head of the 
Commonwealth, but the importance invested in the persona of the 
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Queen; and also the importance then of the selection of the next 
Secretary-General, because you began our conversation by 
emphasising this question of leadership, the need to take political risks 
in the interests of the Commonwealth? 
 
MK: Officials, by their inclination, are people of process. They’re not people of 
principle, taking risks. They want to avoid risks. Officials tend to be risk-
averse. So I think it has proved with Secretary-General Sharma. He may have 
done useful things in the course of his distinguished service as SG. But if any 
were risky, I can’t recall them to mind at the moment. 
 
SO: Do you see the Commonwealth revitalising itself along the lines of a 
smaller club? Sir Ron Sanders always emphasises that the 
Commonwealth is a club, that it has rules, though, and you have to 
abide by them; and whether it will shrink to exclude those who don’t 
have a shared sense of identity, and who don’t share an overt and 
ongoing commitment to universal rights? 
 
MK: I don’t much like the idea of a club, because that has notions of superiority 
and totally common values. The Commonwealth will never be an organisation 
of totally common values. It is simply too diverse. The British in their Empire 
both secured too many countries with too many people on too many 
continents to have a monochrome organisation as the residue of that 
historical link. What has to happen, as it seems to me, is that it has to have 
some core principles to define the utility of retaining it, except as an historical, 
nostalgia trip. When we tried to give a core document, the Charter, plus a 
Commissioner, in order to express core values and give substance to the 
Commonwealth, they took the one, rejected the other. Yet the one without the 
other is completely toothless. It’s not even as strong as an instrument 
endorsed freshly at the end of a CHOGM meeting by Heads of Government.  
It looks grand. But it has no bite. That is the tragedy of the EPG of 2009. The 
idea was a good idea, from Tun Badawi. The execution of the idea involved a 
good proposal from the EPG. The institutional suggestion was an essential 
component of the good idea. However, the institutional suggestion was 
rejected in the pursuit of a quiet life. But that quiet life will ultimately be fatal to 
the Commonwealth as leaving nothing behind but a nostalgic value. 
 
SO: Sir, you mentioned that, in a few days’ time, you were going to be going 
to the Caribbean to meet with Caribbean leaders? 
 
MK: I’ve been invited by the Prime Ministers and the Health Ministers of the 
Caribbean English-speaking countries, to come to a meeting in Kingston. That 
meeting will take place on 8th/9th/10th/11th of April 2014. The focus of the 
meeting will be the HIV AIDS epidemic in the Caribbean. That was itself an 
important focus of the attention of the EPG. I brought that up repeatedly 
during our meetings. Particularly when we had our meeting in Kuala Lumpur.  
I endeavoured to have the urgency of getting reform of the laws that impede 
effective HIV strategies removed from Commonwealth countries. The 
members of the EPG, I think it’s fair to say, or some of them, were a bit 
reluctant at first to go down that track. They were aware that, on issues such 
as homosexuality, there were Commonwealth member countries that were 
very conservative. They were unlikely to welcome suggestions that the laws 
on that subject should be disturbed. But to their great credit, the members of 
the EPG were open-minded enough to listen to the arguments. Especially so 
when I was able to point to another body on which I had served, or was 
13 
 
serving at the time, the United Nations Development Programmes Global 
Commission on HIV and the Law. That body was chaired by former president 
of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. That body was putting out 
documentation which showed, quite graphically and by reference to statistics 
and other information, that in the Caribbean, for example, those countries 
which were members of the Commonwealth, which still had criminal laws 
against gays, had the highest levels of HIV by far. Countries whose legal 
systems were derived from France and Spain, which didn’t have criminal laws 
against gays, and which could therefore reach out to gay people and get them 
involved in self-protection and use of condoms, and reducing the spread of 
the virus, did better. There was a huge disparity between these countries. 
There was a very vivid graph in the UNDP documentation, which showed that 
this was true of Commonwealth countries, save only, I think, it was for 
Bermuda, which had abolished the laws against homosexual conduct. 
 
SO: Probably because it’s a British Crown colony. 
 
MK: It might have been Barbados, I’m not sure. It was one of the Commonwealth 
countries of the Caribbean. They were doing all right. But Jamaica was doing 
horrendously poorly. To their great credit, the members of the EPG, who 
came from different cultures, different religions, and different backgrounds, 
were brought round to see that this was a big Commonwealth issue, a special 
Commonwealth problem. The result of that realism was that there were very 
specific recommendations that there should be the removal of the laws 
against gays, as part of the aspect of the Commonwealth’s response to HIV. 
When that recommendation went up to the Heads of Government, it was put 
in terms of the removal of laws that involve “discrimination”. The Heads of 
Government, or their officials, added a rider. This said that it will be a matter 
for each Commonwealth country to decide, what is “discrimination”. But that 
was a way of saying, ‘Well we’re just going to continue doing what our culture 
and our religion suggests we should.’ The net result of this has been that the 
levels of HIV in Commonwealth Caribbean countries, and in African countries 
as well, have remained extremely serious. It’s become doubly urgent, 
because the first-line therapies are now developing of side-effects. There’s a 
need to move to the second-line therapies. These are much more expensive 
because they’re under patent and not available in the form of cheaper generic 
pharmaceuticals. That means that it’s going to be much more expensive to 
fight the war on AIDS in the Caribbean, Africa and India. That means, in turn, 
that the Caribbean Heads of Government and Ministers of Health are facing 
this danger. So they’ve invited me to come back to Jamaica, and to talk to 
them about this issue. I’m not sure that that arises out of the EPG report. It 
may arise out of the UNDP report. I know that UNDP has something to do 
with the organisation of the meeting. Probably the Commonwealth Secretariat 
would never do anything so courageous and challenging. 
 
SO: But, Sir, why should they be separate? It seems, there is this cross-
fertilisation of ideas between the EPG and the UNDP? 
 
MK: It should be. But the initiative has not come from the Commonwealth. The 
initiative, I think, has come from PANCAB, whatever that is – Pan-Caribbean, 
AIDS initiative no doubt. I don’t know if it’s going to have non-Commonwealth 
countries. I think it might be just be English-speaking Commonwealth 
participating countries, in the Caribbean. It’s going to be a serious meeting. 
I’m told that leaders are now facing up to the necessities. Certainly, they want 
me there to try and help in that process by encouraging respectful but truthful 
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dialogue. That was one of the best things about the EPG report. Yet I don’t 
know that it has had much impact. But that is because of the rider, that it’s a 
matter for each Commonwealth country to decide what is “discrimination”. 
That is, I think, something officials may have put into the resolution to guard 
their patch. 
 
SO: But that suggests a strongly positive outcome, in fact, from the EPG 
report, of the Commonwealth implementing progressive legal, and then 
consequential, social change in a regional function. 
 
MK: The EPG report may be part of one of the ingredients that had played a part 
in organising the meeting I will certainly be referring to the EPG report. And to 
the way in which the Commonwealth leaders, or the Commonwealth, advisory 
group, came round to its recommendations. It was very interesting to me, 
because as a gay man myself, I didn’t know whether the EPG would see the 
importance of these links. I was very open about my sexuality. There was no 
question about that. It was a case of all cards on the table. It would not have 
been a surprise to me if some, at least, or maybe even most, of the members 
of the EPG had said, ‘Oh, we’re not going there – the Commonwealth isn’t 
ready, or this is very, very controversial, this is political’. But they said, above 
all this is about life. These are human lives of Commonwealth citizens. This is 
people dying a painful death prematurely. It is doing great damage to their 
economy. Therefore, if we deal with it in the context of HIV/AIDS, as a special 
Commonwealth problem (which are the words in the EPG report) we are 
doing the right thing- objectively, scientifically, legally right. That was the spirit 
in which the Commonwealth approached the matter. The Secretary-General, 
to his credit, has given rather cautious, and sometimes rather tepid, support 
on this issue. He’s said the right things on occasion. But it hasn’t been a 
whole-hearted, energetic push. He has not said boldly: you can’t leave the tap 
on getting money from rich countries to give anti-retroviral drugs to poor 
Commonwealth countries, but leaving the tap on by allowing people to just 
keep getting infected, because you have no real outreach to them. Or 
because you’re hostile to them. Because you stigmatise them. Because you 
criminalise them. Because you penalise them. Because you harass them by 
the police. To do all this and then to wonder why they’re not getting the 
essential messages, and not responding, and coming forward, having the 
test, getting onto the drugs, and so on, should not really be surprising. 
 
SO: Sir, can I say then that the EPG exercise was a classic case of idealistic 
pragmatism? 
 
MK: I would rather say, the EPG acted on principle. The implementation has been 
watered down by so-called, pragmatic officials and politicians. The EPG came 
to a conclusion, yes. This is what is right. Therefore Christian, Muslim and 
atheists, from all the continents serving on the EPG, said, ‘This is what we 
should do’. They were brave and strong. That’s exactly the sort of thing a 
Commissioner of an EPG should be appointed to do. By persuasion, 
respectful dialogue, inter-action, ceaseless effort, energy, intelligence, 
education, you will ultimately get through to people. However, if you don’t 
have the institution, and you don’t have the personnel, and you don’t have 
good and courageous people, then it’ll just drift along. No-one will be upset. 
But nothing important will be achieved. Sadly, on HIV/AIDS and homosexual 
offences, that is where we are in the Commonwealth. If anything, things have 
actually got worse since the EPG report. That costs the lives of 
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Commonwealth citizens. And this is the true price the Commonwealth pays 
for lack of strong and principled leadership. 
 
SO: Mr Kirby, thank you very much indeed. 
 
[END OF AUDIOFILE] 
